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ABSTRACT 
In today’s world, complexity and uncertainty are the only 
given factors in the management of global supply chains. 
International relief chains are influenced by complexity 
arising from fluctuating demand information and flows, 
donor funding processes, as well as the challenges of 
mobilising logistics assets on a global scale and the 
geographical terrain of the humanitarian theatre. 
Environmental and supply complexity and uncertainty can 
have a significant operational and financial impact on 
both business firms and international relief chains. 
Therefore, an understanding of the nature and causes of 
complexity in supply and relief chains is critical to 
effective supply chain management. This exploratory 
paper highlights the characteristics of the relief chain, 
discusses the nature and causes of complexity in both 
commercial and relief chains, and suggests ways to 
managing complexity, specifically in relief chains. 
Attempting to manage complexity in humanitarian supply 
chains in an unsystematic, piecemeal, and non-strategic 
manner can result in sub-optimal outcomes, waste of 
resources, and loss of lives. The proposed strategies can 
help logistics and supply managers in humanitarian 
organisations to balance logistics/operational 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency, as well as provide the 
optimal level of ‘service’ to all the supply chain members 
through the identification of strategies for understanding 
and simplifying supply chain complexity. The 
contribution of the paper is an inter-disciplinary solution 
to an important supply chain issue through the 
incorporation of recommendations from research in 
various disciplines. The proposed strategies contribute to 
the relief chains’ ability to promptly deliver relief to 
disaster sites and the saving of lives. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A large international relief community has developed 
since the Second World War [1]. It includes multilateral 
agencies such as the world Food Programme (WFP), and 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) which is supported entirely by  private, 
voluntary contributions, mainly by the wealthier donor 
governments both in cash and in kind, as well as a wide 
range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) both 
national and international [2]. The delivery of relief aid is 
influenced by political and military convenience of both 
donor and recipient countries, media appeal of the 
disaster, and to the exigencies of the ‘donor industry’. 
Relief aid delivery often lacks a coordinated plan. NGOs 
often compete with each other for donations, with donors 
generally more sympathetic to short-term emergencies 
than longer-term developmental aid leading to wide 
divergence in levels of funding [3,4]. However, 
coordinated supply chains are well-established in the 
commercial sector, and this paper seeks to highlight the 
key characteristics of the relief supply chain, the nature 
and causes of complexity in commercial and relief supply 
chains, and suggests strategies for managing complexity 
in supply chains from the relief perspective. The paper 
applies key assumptions of complexity in commercial 
supply chain management to determine their suitability 
for the analysis of complexity in relief supply chains. 
 
The relief chain 
. 
Figure 1. A typical humanitarian supply chain  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The supply chain in Figure 1 describes a multilateral 
approach through international agencies such as the 
World Food Programme (WFP), and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Care 
International and World Vision. Relief is often given on a 
bilateral country-to-country basis, and delivered in a 
number of ways. Unlike most commercial supply chains, 
the relief supply chain is often unstable. Sometimes, the 
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supply chain breaks down at the receiving end [3,5,6], but 
it may also be unstable at its origin because of politicised 
donations by governments and the competitive nature of 
fund-raising from private donors, as well as the level of 
media appeal [7,8,9]. Good practice in commercial supply 
chain management literature includes some basic 
assumptions such as: there should be a planned approach, 
that a longer-term, strategic perspective is adopted, and 
that it is important to coordinate functions [10, 11,12]. If 
we attempt to apply such concepts from the ‘commercial 
model’ to the relief chain, we find many parallels but also 
important differences. There is evidence of a frequent 
lack of planning in relief supply chains, resulting in 
inefficiencies. For example,  the overuse of expensive and 
unsafe air charter, failure to pre-plan stocks, congestion at 
ports caused by unplanned deliveries [6], delivery of 
useless or unwanted items to disaster victims and a lack 
of inter-organisational collaboration for information 
systems [13,14]. Nevertheless, steps are taken to 
anticipate events [6,15]. The WFP or the relevant UN 
agencies, such as UNICEF or UNHCR, usually play a 
leading role in the mobilisation of relief goods and in 
primary logistics in large-scale disasters. The WFP, for 
instance, may be responsible for all food aid logistics up 
to the extended delivery points (EDPs) at inland 
destinations close to the affected area with other 
humanitarian agencies or governments of recipients 
responsible thereafter [16]. Logistics coordination 
between NGOs has improved in recent humanitarian 
operations [17,18] with shared equipment, assets, or 
resources such as aircraft, trucks, food stocks, forklifts 
etc., and with some agencies or even individuals 
designated as having the best local knowledge and 
contacts. 
 
The longer-term, strategic perspective is not widespread, 
despite some improved coordination; evidence suggests 
that the delivery of relief to disaster stricken countries has 
become less strategic in the past decade [6, 13]. Some 
authors argue that a better model would be a “relief to 
development continuum” where there is a transitional 
stage [3], similar to the changing marketing and logistics 
strategies required for different stages of the product life 
cycle [19]. International relief organisations may also be 
issue-related and therefore exist only temporarily, with 
each humanitarian effort requiring a totally new supply 
chain and a project approach [20]. 
 
The importance of coordinated functions  
International emergency relief logistics and supply 
operations frequently require the involvement of several 
governments and independent NGOs, as well as the use of 
a number of transport modes [21]. International relief 
operations may become complex because of 
administrative and logistical bottlenecks arising from 
poor infrastructure in the aid-receiving region and the 
multiplicity of agencies and governments [17[, and are 
often in conflict zones, thus, hindering efficient delivery 
and distribution of relief cargoes to the needy [17]. Poor 
coordination may also contribute to complexity both at 
the disaster site and at donor countries [22,23] because of 
geographical dispersion, insufficient or inaccurate 
communication and information flows between the field 
and the head offices of relief organisations, and between 
different organisations [24]. Byman et al. [6] provide a 
comprehensive review of NGO organisational structures, 
although largely from the perspective of potential 
collaboration with the US military. They claim that there 
are too many participants in the field without a clear 
division of labour, and refer to differences between the 
focus of NGO headquarters and their field workers, with 
the former more concerned with relationships with donors 
than with delivery to aid recipients. All these they claim 
contribute to complexity in the delivery of relief. The 
following section highlights the fundamental differences 
between the commercial supply chain and its relief 
counterpart. 
 
Commercial versus relief supply chains  
Commercial supply chains focus on the final customer as 
the source of income for the entire chain. However, in 
relief chains the end user (the recipient or consumer of 
aid) almost never enters into a commercial transaction 
and has little control over supplies [25]. He gets what he 
is given. The end-users of relief supplies are not 
customers of the supplier, transport-carrier, or donor. 
Instead, ‘customer service’ and the ‘marketing’ of the 
relief service may need to target the supplier/donor, who 
has to be convinced that humanitarian relief action is 
actually taking place. For example, there may be greater 
‘humanitarian visibility’ and media appeal in providing 
food or medicine before basic logistical equipment such 
as forklifts, although the latter may be necessary for 
effective delivery of the former [6]. The end-users of 
relief are usually, not involved in a commercial 
transaction, because they are not paying for the relief 
goods they receive. Similarly, the end-user of relief goods 
has no complaint mechanism against donor governments 
or relief NGOs [14,25]. Transactions do, however, take 
place within relief supply chains, although not necessarily 
in open markets. For instance, government aid may be 
tied to making purchases from donor country companies 
and some commercial suppliers of materials or services 
may offer reduced rates e.g. ocean shipping companies.  
 
Most supply chain literature refer to organisations as 
businesses that make profits through serving and 
satisfying customers, however, relief supply chains are 
not for profit. Likewise, supply chains have been referred 
to as a sequence of transactions that may be intra-firm, or 
inter-firm in a network, relief chains are ad-hoc, and may 
vary from one disaster to the next, unlike their 
commercial counterparts that are relatively stable, 
repetitious and routinised. Emergency relief logistics and 
supply chains have been described variously as the 
logistics of an event, or a project [13,26]. Commercial 
supply chains focus on the final customers as the source 
of income for the entire supply chain, and as the driver of 
innovation, and delivery of value. In contrast to the 
commercial supply chain, the originating supplier may 
also be a donor who has to be convinced that 
humanitarian action is taking place, so that measures of 
‘customer service’ needs to be aimed at the 
supplier/donor, because many times donors are the 
‘customers’ to which NGOs (and other agencies) are 
accountable and have a reporting responsibility [8]. If 
donors are not satisfied with NGO performance, they will 
not give any more funds. The following section discusses 
the nature and causes of complexity, in order for us to 
understand strategies to simplify and reduce complexity 
in the relief chain. 
 
The nature and causes of complexity  
Today’s global environment is characterised by 
complexity, volatility and uncertainty [27,28]. The 
intricate web of organisational and trans-organisational 
processes is a source of supply complexity, and the 
unexpected rapid onset disaster also contributes to 
demand variability. In humanitarian relief chains for rapid 
onset disasters like tsunamis and earthquakes, the sheer 
number of organisations involved in the respond 
contributes to complexity. For example, the coordination 
host and donor governments, municipal authorities, a 
large number of local and international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), transport companies, local 
churches, partner organisations and so forth all add to the 
complexity and increases response time in aid of victims. 
Complexity is an unnecessary cost of doing business as it 
creates inefficiencies, reduces productivity, and increases 
costs [29]. It also decreases an organisations ability to 
respond quickly to customers. Complexity makes it more 
difficult for customers, suppliers and other supply 
network/value chain members to do business with the 
organisation. At the operational level, managers and 
employees’ work becomes overly complex, intricate and 
challenging [28,30]. In commercial supply chains, 
complexity comes in many different forms, it occurs at 
various stages of the business model and the supply 
process, however, complexity refers to things: ‘unduly 
intricate’, ‘not easily understood, used or analysed’ [28]. 
In business terminology, the word complex is often used 
to describe products, services, systems, markets, and 
organisations as regards the difficulty of tackling the task 
at hand. It is often associated with unnecessary time 
wasting, as well as increased risk, which may result for 
example, from over-reactions, unnecessary interventions, 
second-guessing, distrust and distorted information 
throughout a supply chain [27,31,32]. In inventory 
management the well known “bull whip effect” which 
describes rising fluctuations of order/demand patterns 
from the retailer through the wholesaler and up the 
manufacturer and supplier is an example of such 
complexity within the supply chain, and it leads to higher 
costs and inefficiencies, as well as poorer service to the 
customer [33,34]. Complexity is used to describe 
something that has more steps, content, processes, or 
requirements than necessary [29]. It appears to grow over 
time and hampers organisational performance [35]. 
Similarly, in the relief supply chain, the various processes 
for an international relief response include, host 
governments formally requesting assistance, the United 
Nations (UN) and NGOs launching an appeal for disaster 
funding and goods-in-kind, mobilisation of relief 
professionals like doctors, nutritionists, epidemiologists 
and search and rescue professionals and so forth. Also 
there has to be a needs assessment of what the victims of 
the disaster require (e.g. food, blankets, medicines) and 
what responding international relief organisations require 
to make and sustain an effective response (e.g., rebuilding 
of roads, air traffic control and other logistics 
infrastructure). In commercial supply chains complexity 
may arise from government regulations, for example, the 
mandatory and voluntary security regimes in place post 
9/11 at the port of loading such as container security 
initiative (CSI), at sea and en-route as well as the 
maritime / seaport interface, for example customs 
inspections and verification of cargoes [36]. In the relief 
chain, assuming all donor country/upstream activities 
such as fund raising, packing, loading and forwarding are 
completed, the relief cargoes still have to undergo the 
usual customs procedures although in a somewhat 
expedited rate. At the port of discharge, the same 
procedures are repeated. In addition, the nature of the 
supply process itself contributes to complexity, for 
example, is the product to be delivered critical to 
operations? Is it to be delivered just in time (JIT)? Is it to 
be delivered straight up to the disaster sites? In a sector 
where suppliers are few and specialised and most relief 
goods not purchased in open markets, any delays or 
failures in the part of suppliers will cause delays in the 
relief supply chain. The nature of the sourcing system is a 
potential source of complexity. For example, is it a 
singular transaction or a continuing relationship? In an 
on-going supply relationship, uncertainty and complexity 
is reduced because buyer and supplier know each other 
well. In a one-off big item purchase, the procurement 
process is more complex as the buyer and seller may not 
have had a previous commercial relationship, therefore, 
there is a need for stringent prior research and pre-
selection processes before a decision is made, of course, 
this further contributes to time pressure. The rating and 
qualification of prospective suppliers may be complex as 
information from formal and informal sources is 
processed in order to choose the best supplier to meet all 
the requirements of the purchasing organisation. In 
international sourcing, there may be currency 
complexities and monetary differences, as well as psychic 
distance and language differences between the purchasing 
NGO and the suppliers. Issues of the number and network 
of suppliers, supplier turnover, supplier dispersion and 
location may increase the level of supply complexity. 
With up to half of a typical supplier's costs contained in 
its supply base, the ability of the lower tier suppliers to 
meet requirements such as just-in-time delivery is a 
critical factor for a cost-effective and agile relief chain 
capability [28,29]. Distorted or truncated information can 
increase costs in the form of ‘just-in-case’ inventories, 
premium air freight and unplanned procurements, thus 
adding to supply complexity [30]. The nature and density 
of the network, for example the management of transport 
mode selection, as well as carrier choice, number of 
logistics and marketing intermediaries, and number of 
ports of entry are other sources of complexity in supply 
chain planning for disaster response. For example, a 
typical large international NGO may receive relief goods 
from scores of suppliers in 20 countries, and have to 
manage a large number of forwarders, customs brokers, 
insurance companies, ports of loading and discharge, 
export agencies and inland carriers, as well as a 
combination of several dozen combinations of origin and 
destination [36]. It may also have to coordinate with the 
militaries of host and donor countries in distributing relief 
to the victims of a disaster.  The product itself has 
consequences for the management of supply chains: its 
damage potential, its dimensions, packaging, storage or 
transport, as well as from its inherent physical nature, is a 
source of complexity. The nature of the commercial 
supply chain member organisation, its organisational 
structure (e.g., centralised or decentralised), and historical 
nature of its growth influences complexity. For example, 
merged and acquired organisations have unique problems 
of organisational structure, as well as computer systems 
which may not be compatible and do not communicate 
with each other hence resulting in manual data re-entry. 
Another factor is an organisational culture that fosters 
functional silo mentality, for example, sister divisions and 
strategic business units (SBUs) in the same organisation 
that do not cooperate with each other. Finally, 
organisational complexity often means job security for 
some persons, who spend their energy doing well what 
should not be done at all.  
 
Strategies in managing complexity 
The inability of international humanitarian organisations 
to make particular relief items available when needed is 
critical for many suffering people. Although international 
relief chains are clearly unpredictable, turbulent, and 
require flexibility, the ability to thrive and prosper in an 
environment of constant and unpredictable change 
requires responsiveness and a mastery of turbulence [37]. 
In addition, relief chains require developing an 
organisation-wide capability that embraces organisational 
structures, information systems, logistics processes, and 
mindsets [38], in order to reduce complexity in the relief 
chain. Several strategies for managing complexity in 
relief chains are discussed below. 
 
Funding 
As stated earlier, the ‘customer’ to be satisfied in the 
relief chain is in effect the donor. Therefore, the 
management of complexity in the context of relief chains 
must begin by addressing the unstable nature of funding 
at its source [39], and the donor funding process. For 
example, in practice, institutions such as charities are 
regularly required to raise large amounts of money at very 
short notice to provide emergency assistance. Concern by 
donor governments for certain aid to be used for specific 
relief operations in particular countries drives relief 
organisations to focus on short term direct relief and 
distribution, rather than longer term investment in 
logistics systems and supply processes. Therefore, the 
donors should be made aware of how crucial an efficient 
funding process is to the management of complexity 
within the relief chain and steps taken to develop a 
streamlined, user friendly, centralised funding mechanism 
to reside with the United Nations (UN). This centralised 
pot of funds must not be skewed towards political, 
security, or media interests of powerful donors, but is 
solely focussed on need. Consequently, the authors 
propose a large, common pool of emergency response 
fund, subscribed to by each donor country every three 
months. For example, based on gross domestic product 
(GDP), 7-10% of GDP should be levied on each donor 
country annually, so that the common pot of funds kept 
filled for any humanitarian emergency, so that donor 
governments cannot ‘cherry-pick’ which disaster they 
like. To make this proposal worthwhile, a specific 
universal measure of humanitarian need should be 
developed which is objective and will not lead to donors 
picking and choosing only the ‘disasters’ that serve their 
interests or to any other ambiguity as to the required 
urgency, or, otherwise of any disaster that occurs. This 
universal measure of humanitarian need will serve as a 
unified trigger mechanism for immediate release of funds, 
hence, prompt relief action and prompt setting up of the 
relief chain from donors, through NGOs and host 
governments to the victims. Although it may prove 
difficult to convince donors of the desirability of the 
routines and procedures necessary for longer-term supply 
chain efficiency and but which have low media impact, as 
well as the donors’ rights to choose where they want to 
put their money.  
 
Standardisation and transaction time 
As earlier stated, supply complexity has a negative 
implication for transaction costs, risks, responsiveness, 
and innovation within each organisation and the entire 
relief supply chain. A look at the hierarchy and flow of 
relief goods and services from source (suppliers/donors) 
through to final consumption and use by victims, one will 
find areas of the supply chain where opportunities exist to 
reduce complexity. For example, the relief goods being 
purchased and the creation of product/service 
specifications may be simplified with regard to a 
reduction in the number of transactions, the delivery of 
the product, as well as the supply relationships. In 
addition, a reduction in the number of suppliers will 
contribute to the management of complexity. Likewise, 
standardising the product/service specifications will result 
in fewer specifications for what are basically similar 
items like blankets, cooking utensils, medicines, food, 
tents, and so forth, continual pruning of weak, low 
volume, low demand items. Similarly, the cost of 
transactions, i.e., time spent by buyers such as 
international NGOs and donor governments compared to 
the value obtained from using the particular type of 
transaction may need to be analysed with a view to 
having fewer transactions. Likewise, the establishment of 
direct links between the aid recipients and the suppliers 
may positively contribute to a reduction in complexity. 
This strategy has been used in the retail industry for many 
years. For instance in the well known vendor managed 
inventory strategy where the vendor/supplier manages the 
inventory on behalf of the retailer, thereby freeing the 
wholesaler to concentrate on higher value activities. Thus, 
suppliers may be asked to manage inventories at disaster 
sites, freeing up NGOs to focus on distribution. The use 
of general blanket agreements in supplier contracts is 
another strategy for reducing complexity and reducing 
transaction costs. 
 
Metrics 
Most organisations do not use metrics that track 
complexity. Supply chain leaders focus more rigorously 
on product and component rationalization, and use 
metrics such as the number of configurations offered and 
the number of component parts more effectively than 
others, however, appropriate supply chain metrics must be 
developed to measure complexity. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The paper provides an exploratory, but useful structure 
within which to understand the generation of uncertainty 
and complexity within a supply chain. The important 
implications for management are: sudden changes (in 
demand) can occur unexpectedly due to unforeseen and 
uncontrollable circumstances. A chaotic rise in demand 
can occur, generated by the system i.e. the ‘bull whip 
effect’ and not necessarily as the result of external events. 
In addition, longer-term planning is very difficult, and if 
longer-term plans are made the plans need to be reviewed 
on a regular basis to accommodate perturbations as they 
arise in the relief chain. The relief chain should be treated 
and planned as a complete system, i.e., a holistic approach 
is mandatory as small changes made to optimise one 
echelon of the supply chain can result in massive changes 
in other parts of the supply chain. It is also necessary to 
focus on the aid recipients as the reason for the existence 
of the relief chain. Demand information should be 
communicated as far upstream to donors (and associated 
funding processes) as possible for demand information 
accuracy to trigger the correct amount of funding for 
relief. 
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